The activity of the will concerns only internal Priya Anjeli Rai decisions, the choice of a judgement about the good. The will has dominion over its acts in relation to all the goods that are presented in judgements, as long as these are not infinite goods. This means that our will, and we ourselves, are incapable of not wanting the good as good, if the good is the formal object of the will. No active power can be neutral in relation to its formal object. Consequently, if we affirm the exist­ence of the will as the appetitive power of the intellect, then it possesses its own formal object, an object that imposes a certain necessity, and this is the good as the analogically conceived Priya Anjeli Rai good. In relation tothe good as good, thus understood, we do not possess any freedom of the will, for all the acts of the will aim at their object under the 9ngle of and in the perspective of the good, even when we are bringing about what is objectively evil. The will, however, in the acts it deliberately elicits, is not subject to coercion, since these acts flow from the will itself and remain within it. If, then, the will in this way elicits its own acts, it can do so only in accord with its own formal object and with its own internal structure. Consequently, no one can com­mand from outside the deliberate internal acts of the will. This is not the case in external acts of the will, those which are concerned with the external execution of a decision. The external executions of acts of the will may be and sometimes are compelled as a result of coercion and violence.

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